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 Among institutions of advanced legal systems, few have been more per-
plexing than the right to a fair trial. An important reason is its content, espe-
cially the relation of the institution to fairness or equity.  
 The purpose of this paper is to provide, by correlating some well known 
episodes of legal philosophy that are usually kept apart, a new look at fair-
ness of equity as an essential element of law understood as a way of reason-
ing. To that end the paper is divided in the following three sections: (1) Aris-
totle's conception of fairness as higher justice and an essential element of law; 
(2) the modern conception of equity, which relies on Kant's philosophy and 
assumes that equity is subjective and arbitrary unlike legal justice, which is 
objective and reasonable; (3) A recent turn in philosophy of law.  
 The brief analysis of selected key episodes of the history of the idea of 
equity or fairness allows some tentative conclusions. First, contemporary discus-
sion in legal philosophy, most notably contributions of Lon Fuller, John Rawls 
and Ronald Dworkin, suggest, like Aristotle's practical philosophy, that there 
are good reasons to understand equity as a way of reasoning that is an essen-
tial element of law. Second, equity is a way of reasoning that involves moral 
insight into a unique constellation of both a characteristically unique detail of 
a practical situation and the peculiar structure of the whole to which the 
detail belongs. Third, the holistic nature of equity explains such phenomena as 
the diversity of rights lumped together under the label the right to a fair 
trial. What makes a trial fair is precisely a proper balance of a wide variety 
of rights and duties, which is in principle unique in every single case. 
 
 Among institutions of advanced legal systems, few have been more per-
plexing than the right to a fair trial. An important reason is its content, 
especially the relation of the institution to fairness or equity. On the one 
hand, the right often seems to be merely a label of a bundle of widely 
different procedural rights. Thus the subject Fair Trial in the index of a 
leading US casebook on criminal procedure is followed by the instruction 
See Due Process; Jury Trial; Newspaper and Television; Trial by; Pretrial Pub-
licity.1 Likewise, a leading comment of the fair trial clause (article 6, sec-
tion 1) of the European Convention of Human Rights analyses the clause 
 
  *A revised version of the paper read at the round table “Pravo na pravi~no 
su|enje” (The Right to a Fair Trial) organised by the Croatian Law Centre in 
Zagreb, December 20, 1996. 
  1Yale Kamishar, Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure: 
Cases, Comments and Questions, 6th ed. (St.Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 
1986), at p.1543.  
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under headings that include inter alia the following: right of access to a tri-
bunal; right to a fair hearing (in particular, right to the equality of arms); 
right to a public trial and judgement; right to obtain a judgment 'within a 
reasonable time'; right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.2 On the other hand, partly due to the diversity of rights involved in 
the concept of a fair trial, the adjective fair as its distinctive property 
seems to be related only in name to fairness or equity, which have been 
commonly regarded as a way of reasoning relevant to law since Antiquity.  
 Another perplexing feature of the concept of fair trial is the relation-
ship between fairness and discretion. Legal intuition should suggest that an 
official ought to excercise his discretion fairly. However, this is not how 
the intuition of continental European lawyers operates. European lawyers 
still tend to assume that discretion is something that is excercised by ad-
ministrative or executive officials and as such outside the jurisdiction of 
judges.3 Furthermore European lawyers still tend to understand discretion 
as the power that is related to expediency rather than fairness or justice 
and consists in choosing freely not only ends but also means of adminis-
trative action.4 Even in the United States, where the idea that judges have 
vast discretionary powers is commonplace, there are few systematic writings 
on the subject.5 A hiatus between discretion and fairness can best be seen 
in writings of Ronald Dworkin, which have probably made the most sig-
nificant impact on legal philosophy in the last quarter of a century. The 
early writings were preoccupied with the positivist notion of discretion 
 
  2O. Jacot-Guillamord, “Rights Related to Good Administration of Justice 
(Article 6)”, in R.St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), 381, 
at pp.391-98.  
  3On limited powers of the French and especially German judiciary, in 
comparison to the British judiciary, to review administrative discretion in the early 
20th century see the Croatian classic Ivo Krbek, Diskreciona ocjena (Zagreb: JAZU, 
1937), at 77 ff. Meanwhile, differences between the three systems have largely 
disappeared. See briefly the comparative studies: Zaim N. Nedjati, English and 
Continental Systems of Administrative Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1978), at 
pp.92-93; Mahendra P. Singh, German Administrative Law: In Common Law 
Perspective (Berlin: Springer, 1985), at pp.83-101; Spyridon Flogatis, Administrative 
law et droit administratif (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1986), at 193-95.  
  4See e.g. Karl Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken, 5.Aufl.(Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1971), at p.128 f. 
  5For a systematic account of the subject see Aharon Barak, Judical Discretion, 
tr. from Hebrew (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 
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without even mantioning fairness as an important concept.6 In Dworkin's 
later work fairness is a central concept while discretion is left to oblivion.7 
 In Croatia the concept of fair trial is beset by additional difficulties. 
The standard Croatian edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics translates 
the key term at 1137a24 as impartial (nepristrano) rather than equitable 
(pravi~no).8 The standard Croatian textbook of legal theory, which is broad 
enough to discuss at length judicial law-making, customary law, law of so-
cial integration in Georges Gurvitch's sense, the nature of things,9and even 
Article 1 of the Swiss civil code,10 does not mention equity or fairness. 
The only two Croatian monographs on the subject, which are both 
devoted to equity in international law, ignore discussion of equity in con-
temporary philosophy and legal theory.11 Perhaps the most puzzling aspect 
of the matter is the fact that pravi~nost, which is the standard Croatian 
translation of equity or fairness (επιεικεια, aequitas), is sometimes used in 
Serbian to mean justice (δικαιοσυνη, justitia) , while the term pravednost, 
which is the standard Croatian translation of justice, is in Serbian used to 
mean equity or fairness.12 Hence it is not surprising that even some pro-
fessional philosophers in Croatia believe that the term pravi~nost is not 
only foreign to Croatian but also redundant to philosophy.  
 The purpose of this paper is to provide, by correlating some well 
known episodes of legal philosophy that are usually kept apart, a new 
look at fairness or equity as an essential element of law understood as a 
way of reasoning. To that end the paper is divided in three sections, 
which discuss briefly the following problems: (1) Aristotle's conception of 
fairness as higher justice and an essential element of law; (2) the modern 
conception of equity, which relies on Kant's philosophy and assumes that 
 
  6See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, New Impression (London: 
Duckworth, 1977), index at pp.369-71.  
  7See Id., Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1988), index at 
pp. 455-70. 
  8Aristotel, Nikomahova etika, tr. T. Ladan (Zagreb: Fakultet politi~kih nauka, 
1982), at p.112. 
  9Berislav Peri}, Struktura prava, part 1, 6th edition (Zagreb: SNL, 1978), at 
pp.169-213. 
  10Ibid., at 208 notes that Article 1 (3) of the Swiss Civil Code recognises legal 
doctrine as a subsidiary source of law. However, the Croatian textbook fails to 
note that the same article incorporates verbatim a sentence on equity from 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. See more in note 15. 
  11Vladimir D. Degan, L’equite et le droit international (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1970); 
Josip Metelko, Pravi~nost u sukcesiji dr`ava (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet, 1992).  
  12See esp. the leading Serbian authority on the ancient Greek literature Milo{ 
N. \uri}, Istorija helenske etike (Beograd: Zavod za izdavanje ud`benika Narodne 
republike Srbije, 1961), at pp.434-35. 
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equity is subjective and arbitrary unlike legal justice, which is objective 
and reasonable; (3) A recent turn in philosophy of law, which indicates 
that discretion involves considerations of equity and constitutes an essential 
element of law. Concluding remarks point out the relevance of the discus-
sion in this paper to a proper understanding of the right to a fair trial 
and also to some broader issues of legal and political philosophy.  
 
 1. Aristotle: equity as higher justice and an essential element 
of law 
 Aristotle in chapter V of the Nicomachean Ethics first defines justice as 
a state of character that makes people disposed to act justly and will 
what is just and injustice as a state of character that makes people dis-
posed to act unjustly and will what is unjust. A state of character, like a 
state of health, is always one of the two contraries. The various meanings 
of just and unjust are as follows: the just man is the lawful and fair man, 
while the unjust man is the lawless, in the sense of grasping, and unfair 
man.13 
 Aristotle distinguishes justice in the sense of lawfulness as complete vir-
tue or the sum of all virtues in relation to others from justice as a par-
ticular virtue in relation to others. Unjust acts arising out of cowardice or 
malice are contrary to justice as complete virtue while acts arising out of 
graspingness violate particular justice. Aristotle then distinguishes two prin-
cipal kinds of particular justice, namely, distributive justice, which regulates 
constitutional relations in a political community, and remedial justice, which 
regulates relations in markets. 14 
 Finally, Aristotle in chapter V of the Nicomachean Ethics distinguishes 
justice (δικαιοσυνη, δικαιον; justitia, justum) and equity or fairness 
(επιεικεια ,επιεικηζ; aequitas, aequum). The central part of Aristotle's ar-
gument runs as follows (this is the passage where the Croatian edition 
translates equity as impartiality): 
.. the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice, yet is just, and it 
is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just. The 
same thing, then, is just and equitable and while both are good the equitable 
is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the 
legally just but a correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is uni-
versal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement 
which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak 
universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case,. 
 
  13Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1129a, in The Works of Aristotle, ed. by W.D. 
Ross, vol.9,  
  14Ibid., 1129b25 ff. 
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though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less 
correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature 
of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the 
start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is 
not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator 
fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission - to say what 
the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have 
put into his law, if he had known.15 Hence the equitable is just, and better 
than one kind of justice - not better than absolute justice but better than the 
error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature 
of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its univer-
sality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, 
viz., that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a de-
cree is needed. 16 
 Aristotle draws a line between the functional side of equity, i.e. equity 
as a correction of law, and material equity, i.e. equity as the disposition 
of a man who “tends to take less than his share though he has the law 
on his side...”17 Aristotle's described summarily material equity by a set of 
imperatives that include inter alia the following: “it is equitable... not to 
treat errors and mishaps on a par; ..to excuse the common failings of 
mankind; to consider, not the law as it stands... but the legislator...; not 
the part, but the whole; not the momentary disposition of the agent, but 
his past character; ... to remember benefits one has received more than 
injuries...; to agree to arbitration rather than go to court - for the umpire 
in an arbitration looks to equity, whereas the juryman sees only the 
law.”18 
 For the further analysis it is essential to note the following two dimen-
sions of equity according to Aristotle. First, equity is not something out-
side justice but its part that is higher than legal justice. Second, equity is 
not something outside law but a corrective function of law. It follows 
from these two properties that a law that is from the perspective of eq-
uity unjust must be adapted to demands of higher justice.19 In that Aris-
 
  15“It should be noted that this formulation has been adopted almost literally by 
one of the most modern and most carefully formulated law codes, the Swiss civil 
code of 1907”, Max Hamburger, Morals and Law: the Growth of Aristotle's Legal 
Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), at p.98, n.1. 
  16Aristotle, note 13, 1137b8-29. 
  17Ibid., 1137a f. The terms material and functional are Hamburger's, note 15, at 
p.101 ff. 
  18The Rhetoric of Aristotle, ed. by L. Cooper (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1932), 1374a. 
  19Hamburger, note 15, at p.96. 
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totle differs from its predecessors (especially Plato)20 and also from most 
modern thinkers.  
 
 2. Modern law: equity as subjectivity and arbitrariness  
 Almost the whole historical and strictly philosophical part of the article 
“Equity” in the Historical Dictionary of Philosophy21is devoted to Aristotle's 
view of the problem. The reason for the privileged treatment of the Phi-
losopher is indicated by the quotation from an 18th century translation of 
the Nicomachean Ethics which states that nothing can be added to Aris-
totle's conception of the problem.22 Even the part of the article that is 
devoted to the contemporary juristic analysis of equity reveals that the Ni-
comachean Ethics covers essential aspects of the problem.23 Nonetheless, 
modern views of equity are closer to Kant's than Aristotle's conception.  
 Kant in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, under the heading aequitas 
states roughly the following: when one appeals to equity he is basing his 
claim on his right rather than ethical duties of others; however, in the 
case of a right of equity conditions for determining how much and what 
kind of remedy should be allowed are absent. Kant exemplifies his point 
in the following way: in a commercial company formed under the condi-
tion that partners will share profits equally a partner contributes more 
than other members and then accidentally looses more than others; if he 
bases his demand to receive more than others on strict law his request 
will be refused since the judge has no particular data to serve as a guide 
how much the partner should receive according to the contract. The sam 
applies to a servant whose wages have been paid in a currency that has 
depreciated24 As Kant put it, 
 He can only appeal to equity (a silent goddess who cannot be heard), be-
cause nothing was stipulated about this in the contract and a judge cannot 
pronounce in accordance with unstipulated conditions.  
 From this it follows that a court of equity ... is a self-contradiction. Only 
when the rights of the judge himself are involved and over matters of which 
 
  20Ibid., at p.92. 
  21“Billigkeit”, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd.1, hrsg. von J. Ritter 
(Basel: Schwabe & Co. Verlag, 1971), at 939-40. 
  22See ibid., at p.940. 
  23See ibid., at p.941. 
  24Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, tr. and intr. by J. Ladd 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), at 39-40.  
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he can dispose for his own person may and should there be any hearing for 
equity. 25 
 Kant's view of equity may well look trivial today. A contemporary law-
yer is likely to note that Kant's examples are routine cases of modern le-
gal systems in the late 20th century. Thus the claim of the partner from 
Kant's first example can be settled on the basis of contract law and prin-
ciples of negotiorum gestio and unjust enrichment, provided strict rules do 
not prohibit the application of those principles to the transaction of part-
ners in Kant's example. Kant's servant could have recovered in principle 
even under communist laws. Thus courts of socialist Yugoslavia in the 
1980-is recognised real interest rates, which were much higher than the 
rate permitted by the Yugoslav Law of Obligations of 1978, on the 
ground that the lawgiver did not foresee high inflation.  
 However, objections to Kant's naiveté may easily overlook the following 
two phenomena: first, it is precisely the rapid development of the law of 
extra-contractual obligations (torts, unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio) in 
the last two centuries that has led to frequent interventions of equity in 
Aristotle's sense into legal and contractual justice and as a result has 
changed substantially modern legal systems; second, despite that develop-
ment modern lawyers, not unlike Kant, have assimilated the view that law 
is governed by mathematical reasoning, which is much narrower than legal, 
i.e. practical reasoning as understood by Aristotle.  
 Modern lawyers, who have assimilated the ideal of mathematical ration-
ality, distinguish between decisions that can be grounded in law and deci-
sions that cannot be grounded in such way. Of course, decisions based on 
equity belong to the latter group. The modern assumption is that equity is 
in the final analysis subjective and arbitrary.  
 H.L.A. Hart, probably the best known legal thinker after World War 
II, attempted to justify the distinction by reference to philosophy of lan-
guage of the latter Wittgenstein.26 According to Hart, a legal official de-
cides on the basis of law if facts of the case he is deciding fall under 
the core meaning of the concepts that are involved in the rule he is ap-
plying. If the facts fall under the penumberal meaning of the concepts his 
decision is not based on law. In that case the official's decision is a result 
of discretion.27According to Hart's theory, administrative or judicial 
 
  25Ibid., at 40. 
  26More exactly on F. Waisman’s “Verifiability”, in A. Flew (ed.), Logic and 
Language, 1st Series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), at 117, which is inspired by 
Wittgenstein's latter philosophy. See G.P. Baker, “Defeasibility and Meaning”, in 
P.M.S. Hacker and J.Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of 
H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 26, at p.37.  
  27See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), at 
pp.138-44, 121 ff. 
 
Padjen, I. L., Fairness as an Essential..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 108—119 115 
                                                                                                                                              
discretion can be reviewed from the standpoint of expediency or morality. 
But discretion cannot be reviewed from the standpoint of law since the 
exercise of disrectionary powers is not based on law. 
 To paraphrase Hart's own example,28 if in a park there is a sign “No 
vehicles” a policeman has a legal duty to see to it that automobiles and 
motorcycles, which obviously fall under the core meaning of the concept 
of a vehicle, do not enter the park and and are fined if they do. By the 
same token, the policeman has a legal duty to allow free access to the 
park to roller skates and baby carriages. They obviously do not fall under 
the core meaning of the concept.. But the policeman has a discretion to 
decide whether to allow teenagers' bicycles and ice-cream tricycles, since 
they fall under the penumberal meaning of the concept in question. Fur-
thermore, only a higher administrative official can meaningfully decide all 
the appeals against the policeman's decisions on the admission of vehicles. 
But a judge can decide only appeals against decisions concerning gadgets 
that obviously are or obviously are not vehicles. If a judge were vested 
with the authority to decide appeals against decisions on the exclusion of 
teenagers' bicycles and ice-cream tricycles he would thereby stop being a 
judge and become an administrator or executive, i.e. en official of the po-
litical branch of the government.  
 Hart's conception of meaning, rationality, limits of law and discretion 
looks like a justification of early European systems of judicial review of 
administration rather than a sophisticated theory of legal reasoning derived 
from Wittgenstein anti-positivistic philosophy of ordinary language. The im-
pression is not deceptive. The distinction between the core and penumbra 
of meaning, which Hart has allegedly derived from Wittgenstein's philoso-
phy, can be found also in writings that have hardly had a chance to be 
informed by ordinary language philosophy. Thus Karl Engisch in his Intro-
duction to Juridical Thinking distinguishes Begriffskern and Begriffshof in a 
way that is strikingly similar to Hart's distinction of the core and penum-
bra.29 Belgrade Professor Radomir Luki} suggests in his Introduction to 
Law, again in a way strongly reminiscent of Hart's distinction, that the in-
terpreter of law should take into account the distinction between the cen-
tre (sredi{te) and the periphery (oblast) of a concept.30 Hence Hart's con-
ception of meaning, rationality, limits of law and discretion can best be 
understood as an expression of the communis opinio doctorum in modern 
legal systems but still not as a theory of legal reasoning in legal systems 
that establish the rule of law by expanding judicial review of 
administration.  
 
  28See ibid., at 123. 
  29See Engisch, note 4, at p.108 f. 
  30Radomir D. Luki}, Uvod u pravo 2nd edition (Beograd: Nau~na knjiga, 1976), 
at p.335. 
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 3. Legal systems today: discretion / fairness as reasonableness 
 The article in the Historical Dictionary of Philosophy referred to above 
ends with the remark that equitable reasoning should be analysed in philo-
sophical inquiries into foundations of law. That is the path Ronald 
Dworkin has followed. He started by questioning Hart's understanding of 
the dividing line between law and non-law. Perhaps the best introduction 
to Dworkin is the expanded version of an example he uses to show weak-
nesses of Hart's conception of discretion, and of legal positivist conception 
of law in general.31  
 A captain orders a sergeant to pick five of his men, cross a river and 
destroy enemy fortifications. The sergeant completes the mission but re-
turns from it alone. His defence is that he has followed the orders and 
hence cannot be held responsible for casualties. A major has to decide 
whether the sergeant, or perhaps his captain, should be held legally re-
sponsible for the loss of five men. Dworkin's analysis suggests that the 
major's decision depends essentially on his answer to the following ques-
tion: is the sergeant equally (ir)responsible in the case (a) he picked five 
out of thirty plain G.Is under his command as in the case (b) he had 
under his command inter ail five pioneers, five rangers and five green be-
rets but nonetheless picked out five plain G.Is? Dworkin's analysis suggests 
that the two situations are legally very different. In the case (b) the ser-
geant’s defence that he cannot be held legally responsible for his choice 
of men (i.e. for his culpa in eligendo), because he merely exercised his 
discretion, will be less than convincing. In other words, whether the ser-
geant will be held legally responsible depends essentially on whether he 
exercised his discretionary powers reasonably.  
 Dworkin's criticism concerns primarily discretion rather than fairness or 
equity. Thus he points out that “Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, 
does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of re-
striction”.32Needless to add, fairness, unlike discretion, is not comparable to 
a hole. He also distinguishes, to account for the fact that discretion is 
guided also by expediency, between two standards that guide excerercise of 
discretion, namely, principles, which are requirements of justice or of fair-
ness or of another dimension of morality, and policies, which are require-
ments setting out economic or similar goals to be αattained.33 But pre-
cisely Dworkin's characterisation of principles reveals that his criticism of 
legal positivism revolves around the notion of fairness and, more specifi-
cally around fairness as an essential element of law.  
 
  31See R. Dworkin,”The Model of Rules”, in note 6, at p.32 ff. 
  32Ibid., at 31. 
  33Ibid., at 22. 
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 Perhaps the main defect of Dworkin's theory is that initial formulations 
of the theory relied heavily on John Rawls's A Theory of Justice,34 which 
tried to overcome tensions between social contract theories (esp. Kant's) 
and utilitarian moral theories (esp. Mill's) by using fairness as its central 
concept but without analysing it properly. Suffice it to note here that in 
Rawls' original usage fairness meant something like “free from bias, fraud 
or injustice”,35 i.e. something very similar to the unsophisticated translation 
of Aristotle's επιεικεια by the Croatian transletor. Leaving aside later de-
velopments of Rawls's36 and Dworkin's37 theory, it seems that not only the 
problem which initiated this paper but also the problem of fairness or eq-
uity in general could be clarified by taking into analysing a dimension of 
Aristotle's characterisation of fairness, which is, surprisingly, overlooked in 
recent literature.  
 The dimension in question can be understood as the holistic nature of 
equity. It is holistic in the sense that equitable reasoning qua correction 
of legal justice, if one follows Aristotle, is not the intervention into an 
isolated relationship between two or more legal subjects but an interven-
tion into a whole web of relations that dynamically develop between the 
subjects. In that equitable reasoning is different from reasoning of legal 
justice, which is concerned with isolated relationships between legal sub-
jects. Equitable reasoning grapples with questions of the kind “How the 
web of relations between legal subjects A and B fit the legal (sub)system 
C”, where both the web and the (sub)system are constantly changing due 
to activities and interests of numerous actors, including the subjects in 
question. An example is the question “How Slovenia and Croatia fit the 
Adriatic Sea?”. Reasoning of legal justice or legalistic reasoning deals with 
questions of the kind “If A does X to B what is the equivalent of X 
that B owes to C?”, where the relationship between A and B via X is in 
isolated in principle from all other events.  
 Perhaps the best explications of the relationship between considerations 
of equity and considerations of legal justice have been left by Lon Fuller. 
In The Morality of Law he left the distinction between two kinds of mo-
rality. He characterised them in the following way: 
 
  34John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).  
  35See e.g. J.K. Feibleman, “Rawls' A Theory of Justice”, American Journal of 
Jurisprudence, vol.18 (1973), 198. 
  36See esp. J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy 
of Public Affairs, vol.14 (1985), 223., translated in Croatian in John Rawls, O 
liberalizmu i pravednosti, ed. by M. Matulovi} (Rijeka: Hrvatski kulturni dom 
Rijeka, 1993), 27. 
  37Dworkin, note 7. 
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 The morality of aspiration is most plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy. 
It is the morality of Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realisation of hu-
man powers ..... 
 Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, 
the morality of duty starts at the bottom. It lays down the basic rules without 
which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered society 
directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark. It is the morality 
of the Old Testament and the Ten Commandments. It speaks in terms of 
'thou shalt not' and, less frequently, of 'thou shalt'..38 
 The morality of aspiration and the morality of duty are obviously, al-
though Fuller does not say so, ways of reasoning characteristic of equita-
ble considerations and considerations of legal justice respectively. It is im-
portant to note that the two moralities are not Fuller's only contribution 
to the problem. In his earlier and widely circulated manuscript on the 
forms and limits of adjudication Fuller drew a distinction which was obvi-
ously related to problems that in The Morality of Law were assigned to 
the two types of morality. Iin “The Forms...” he drew a distinction be-
tween polycentric regulatory problems (essentially similar to holistic 
probolems discussed above) and monocentric regulatory problems 
(essentially similar to isolated problems mentioned above). Fuller regarded 
the latter as susceptible to adjudication, i.e. to reasoning consisting of 
considerations of legal justice. But he maintained that essentially polycen-
tric problems could not be solved in a satisfactory way on the basis of 
such considerations.39 This view qualified Fuller, who has been known as a 
strong opponent of legal positivism, as a thinker who was at least in one 
period of his career much closer to positivism than it is commonly 
assumed. However, Fuller's latter conception of the two moralities make 
him a forerunner of the present turn of legal philosophy, which was 
started by Rawls and Dworkin.40 
 
 
  38Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1969), at 5-6.  
  39L. L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”, Harvard Law Review, 
vol.92 (1978), 353; repr. in R.M. Cover and O.M. Fiss, The Structure of Procedure 
(Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1978), 508, at p.517 f. 
  40The fact that Fuller widely circulated “The Forms..” , note 39, but did not 
publish it during his life time, together with the fact that in The Morality of Law 
he introduced the morality of aspiration as a type of reasoning that deals precisely 
with the legal as well as moral problems he considered in “The Forms...” to be 
polycentric and, probably, outside the reach of law, indicates that Fuller in fact 
abandoned his position in “The Forms...” and developed his own solution to the 
problem of discretion, which differs significantly, and is probably in some important 
respects superior to, the solution articulated by Dworkin on the basis of Rawls.  
 
Padjen, I. L., Fairness as an Essential..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 108—119 119 
                                                                                                                                              
 4. Conclusion 
 The brief analysis of selected key episodes of the history of the idea 
of equity or fairness allows some tentative conclusions. First, contemporary 
discussion in legal philosophy, most notably contributions of Lon Fuller, 
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, suggest., like Aristotle's practical phi-
losophy, that there are good reasons to understand equity as a way of 
reasoning that is an essential element of law. Second, equity is a way of 
reasoning that involves moral insight into a unique constellation of both a 
characteristically unique detail of a practical situation and the peculiar 
structure of the hole to which the detail belongs. Third, ithe holistic na-
ture of equity explains such phenomena as the diversity of rights lumped 
together under the label the right to a fair trial. What makes a trial fair is 
precisely a proper balance of a wide variety of rights and duties, which is 
in principle unique in every single case. However, in some situations the 
right to a fair trial includes also an explicit right to a balanced character-
istic detail of the situation, as it does under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, where the right to a fair trial includes also a specific right 
to a fair hearing (see introduction). Fourth, legal and political philosophers 
should study the relationship between legal justice and equity, ond the one 
hand, and legality and legitimacy, on the other. Fifth, moral and political 
philosophers might wish to consider the relationship between moral insight 
into a unique constellation of every practical situation (ϕρονησιζ, 
prudentia, prudence, Klugheit), equitable reasoning, reasoning in terms of 
legal justice, and mathematical reasoning41 (the last two ways are ex 
hypothesis more closely, or at least more obviously, intertwined than, say 
equitable and mathematical reasoning42). 
 
  41On the role of mathematics in the development of Western legal systems see 
esp. Dieter v. Stephanitz, Exakte Wissenschaft und Recht (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970) 
and Gray L. Dorsey, Jurisculture: Greece and Rome (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1989). 
  42It is interesting that the problem does not even occur in Trels Engberg-
Pedersen, Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Insight (Oxford: Clarednon Press, 1983), and 
William F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980). 
